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1964] NOTES AND COMMENTS 187
Either reason, considered with the growing aversion9 9 toward the
in rem action, suggests that an injunctive procedure similar to that
expressly approved in Kingsley Books and used as a standard in
Marcus and Quantity of Books would be unused or unenforceable
legislation. The present North Carolina substantive statute, how-
ever, provides an adequate basis for criminal prosecution and an
acceptable charge to a jury, for in all of the cases since 1957 the
majority has accepted the Roth doctrine as controlling. This leaves.
as the crucial question in such prosecution the issue of obscenity in
fact, and Jacobellis indicates that this point can be settled with
finality only by the Supreme Court of the United States.
ROBERT A. MELOTT
Constitutional Law-Right to Retained
Counsel at Time of Arrest
Escobedo v. Illinois' presented once more to the Supreme Court
the problem of when the right to counsel attaches. Defendant was
brought to police headquarters after being implicated in a murder.
At the time of his interrogation, he was not formally charged; but
he "couldn't walk out the door."2 When told that he had been
tive magazines, Yes, which the committee found objectionable, and Play-
boy, which it did not. The spokesman said:
If you look at... [the one from Yes] you'll see-I don't know
what kind of a grimace you would call that on her face .... It
is such grimaces on the faces that would allow lustful desires to be
aroused .... [But] the picture from Playboy . .. [is] respectable
photography.
Ibid. The dilemma faced by the dealers might have been expressed by the
chief of police of the county seat, a member of the committee, who had
said "I don't know what's obscene. I'd hate to be the one deciding." Id.,
Oct. 6, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1.
On the limited facts reported by the newspaper the case would appear
to be similar to Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), with
the position of the committee equally indefensible. See notes 75 & 76 and
accompanying text supra. But whatever the legality of the action taken,
the case illustrates several important points: "obscenity" is a subjective
matter difficult of definition, especially by committee; operators of local
commercial outlets will resist attempts to control distribution; those opera-
tors will be supported in their resistance by financially strong publishers;
the most effective control may lie in moral suasion aimed at the general
public.
' See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a discussion of the case before the Supreme
Court decision, see Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964).
2 378 U.S. at 479.
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accused, defendant requested to see his lawyer.3 This request was
denied. His attorney arrived at the police station, but was not
allowed to speak with him even though the attorney reminded the
refusing officer of an Illinois statute that allowed the attorney to
consult with his client "except in cases of imminent danger of
escape."' Defendant confessed to the crime after a four-hour period
of interrogation during which he was never advised of the constitu-
tional right to remain silent and never allowed to see his attorney
despite repeated requests by him and the attorney that they be
allowed to meet. At the trial, defendant's attorney argued that the
confession should be excluded since it was obtained after a denial
of counsel. This argument was rejected, the confession was allowed,
and defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed.' It stated that a denial of counsel during interrogation had
not been recognized, in itself, as a denial of due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment.' The court recognized that the
state statute showed a legislative policy against isolating a person
from his attorney, but found that the legislature did not intend to
prevent a reasonable interrogation by the police.7 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari,' and reversed.9 The Court stated that
when a suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to see
his retained attorney during interrogation and has not been effective-
ly warned of the right to remain silent, he has been denied due
'Escobedo had retained an attorney prior to this time. He had been
arrested on the day of the death, ten days before, and interrogated. After
making no statement, he was released on a state court writ of habeas corpus
obtained by his attorney. Ibid.
'All public officers... or persons having the custody of any person
committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any alleged
cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape,
admit any practicing attorney at law of this state, whom such per-
son ... may desire to see or consult, to see and consult such person
so imprisoned, alone and in private, at the jail or other place of
custody ....
Ill.. Laws 1849, p. 99, § 1, 2. Repealed as of Jan. 1, 1964, in Ill. Laws
1963, p. - , § 126-1.
'People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
Id. at 46, 190 N.E.2d at 828. The court added that Escobedo had a
ten day period since a prior release in which to consult with his attorney,
and that it appeared from the record what advice the defendant thought
the attorney would have given since he testified that he saw the attorney
make a motion with his head which he took to mean that he should remain
silent. Id. at 51, 190 N.E.2d at 830.
Id. at 52, 190 N.E.2d at 831.
'Escobedo v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 902 (1963).
'Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
[Vol. 43
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process of law and no statement obtained by the police during this
time may be used against him.'0
The Supreme Court has been presented with few cases involv-
ing the right to retain counsel for representation during formal
state proceedings."1 The right to retain counsel and .to appear with
him in court has been said to be the "most certain conclusion which
can be drawn . . . under the constitutional provisions regarding
counsel in forty-seven states and the ,due process clause of the
Virginia constitution."'" It was formerly unclear, however, at what
time before commencement of formal state trial proceedings the
right to counsel attached. In order to determine if a -defendant
had been denied fourteenth amendment due.process at any step in
the proceedings before trial, the Court established the fundamental
fairness rule.'" Under this rule, the means of determining the neces-
sity of counsel was through an appraisal of all the facts preceding
the trial to see if the absence of counsel resulted in such prejudice
to the defendant as to render the .trial opposed to the fundamentil
principles of fairness.' 4 If such prejudice did result, the evidence
"ld. at 490-91.
" In House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945), where the petitioner was
forced, over protest, to plead to a burglary charge by information without
the aid of retained counsel, the Court said he was denied a fair trial. In
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), the Court said that to refuse a
petitioner the opportunity to retain counsel, even though waived on a specific
charge, after he learned that he would be tried as an habitual criminal, was
a denial of due process.
"BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL 89 (1955).
's Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). Convicted of murdering
his wife, the defendant argued that his confession was coerced through the
lack of food and sleep and continued interrogation which constituted a
denial of due process. He also argued that denial of counsel after the time
of arrest was a denial of due process. He was allowed counsel the day
after his arrest, but the attorney was not present at the time of the accused's
incriminating statements. In affirming the conviction upon appeal, the ab-
sence of counsel was considered to be only one element of fundamental
fairness.
"' As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure
to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the
absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts com-
plained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair
trial. Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as
a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt.
Lisenba v. California, supra note 13, at 236-37. In the federal courts the
denial of counsel is a direct violation of the sixth amendment and grounds
for reversal. This applies to the indigent defendant in the non-capital
cases as well as the capital proceeding. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). The question of when the right attaches has been clarified by two
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW4
obtained after a denial of counsel was excluded.15
The fundamental fairness rule, as it included the right to re-
tained counsel, was closely surveyed by the Supreme Court in two
1958 cases 6 factually similar to Escobedo. Defendants confessed
to crimes after periods of interrogation during which they were
refused an opportunity to consult with counsel. The attorney in
each case argued that the confession, even if voluntary, should have
been excluded because of the denial of counsel during the interroga-
tion. The majority of the Court rejected the contention of the
petitioners that every denial of a request for counsel would be an
infringement of due process without regard to the circumstances.,
In the first case, Crooker v. California," the Court recognized the
right to counsel before trial as one element of fundamental fairness.
However, the Court said that to make it an undeniable right with
exclusion of the confession as a penalty for infringement was too.
federal decisions. In McNahh v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the
Court passed on a statute, Act of 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 416, which imposed
a duty upon the arresting officer to take the arrested, without delay, before
the nearest U.S. commissioner or judicial officer for a hearing, bail or
commitment. Exercising its supervisory power over the federal courts, the
Court held that evidence obtained in violation of this law must be excluded.
The rule was later affirmed in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957), interpreting the same provision in FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) along
with FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(b), which provides that the commissioner shall
inform the arrested of the complaint against him, of his right to retain
counsel, and allow him a reasonable time to consult with counsel. Since
the right attaches when taken before a magistrate and the defendant must
be taken to a magistrate without delay, the right to retained counsel attaches
very close to the time of arrest.
Appointed counsel, also a right under Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, is covered
by FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. If the defendant appears at the arraignment with-
out counsel, the court will assign counsel to represent him at every stage
in the proceedings unless he waives counsel or can obtain his own. In
order to correct any deficiency in the federal proceedings, as to appointed
counsel, an amendment has been proposed to rule 5(b) requiring the com-
missioner to advise the indigent defendant of his right to appointed counsel
at the time of the preliminary hearing. More important, a proposed amend-
ment to rule 44 is designed to provide for the assignment of counsel for
indigents at the earliest possible time without waiting until the defendant
appears in court. Comm. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE or THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT or
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (Dec.
1962). For the full text, see 31 F.R.D. 665 (1963). For a discussion of
the federal rules and the right to counsel in the federal courts, see Note, 39
IND. L.J. 134 (1963).
"E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958).
"8 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958).
1 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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devastating since it would "effectively preclude police questioning-
'fair as well as unfair'-until the accused was afforded opportunity
to call his attorney.""8 That the right to counsel before trial was
only an element of fundamental fairness was stated even stronger
in Cicenia v. Lagay :-' "Were this a federal prosecution we would
have little difficulty in dealing with what occurred under our gen-
eral supervisory power over the administration of justice in the
federal courts .... But to hold that what happened here violated
the Constitution of the United States is quite another matter.
20
In Escobedo, without expressly overruling Crooker and
Cicenia,21 the Court has established a right to retain counsel at the
time of arrest. As a result, the fundamental fairness rule has been
abolished, and the policy of allowing police officials a reasonable
period of interrogation before an accused is entitled to see his
lawyer has been terminated.'
In finding a violation of the fourteenth amendment in Escobedo,
the Court viewed two factors as controlling: (1) the suspect under-
18Id. at 441.
19357 U.S. 504 (1958).
* 20 Id. at 508-09."1 The Court said that in these two cases it rejected the right to see
counsel during interrogation without regard to the circumstances, and that
s Ecobedo differed in that the circumstances necessitated the advice of coun-
sel. To the extent that Cicenia and Crooker were inconsistent with the
principle in Escobedo, they were said not to be controlling. Escobedo v.Illinois; 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
"2 Even though most of the cases are in the area of the right to counsel
in the pre-indictment period, the Court was recently faced with a post-
'indictment question in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The
defendant was indicted for a federal narcotics offense and released on bail
after retaining counsel. Federal agents managed to eavesdrop on a conversa-
tion between the defendant and an informer by use of an electronic device
placed in the informer's car. The Court reversed a conviction on the basis
of the sixth amendment right to counsel even though the decision to exclude
could have been based on the supervisory power of the Court in federal
* proceedings. The Court followed the principle, established in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), that the defendant is entitled to counsel
during the most critical period of the proceedings and said that the period
of consultation, investigation, and preparation was just as critical as the
trial itself. The fact that the defendant was not in police custody made
no difference to the Court. It was held that this principle, to be effective,
must apply to any indirect interrogation as well as that in the jailhouse.
As .a result, it appears that federal agents are prohibited from eliciting a
confession after the right to counsel attaches, regardless of custody. Quaere,
will this rule be applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment?
Justice Goldberg seems to think so. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
484-85 (1964). For a discussion of Massiah after the circuit court opinion,
see 76 HAiv. L. Rnv. 1300 (1963).
: 1964]
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going interrogation had been denied his request to consult with his
counsel; and (2) the police had not effectively warned him of the
constitutional right to remain silent. These two factors must be
closely considered in determining whether any limitations may be
placed on the right to retained counsel at the time of arrest.
Would the failure of the accused to make an affirmative request
for a lawyer constitute a waiver of the right? There is little im-
portance in the failure to request counsel in the federal courts since
the absence of such a request would be considered a waiver of the
constitutional right only if made competently and intelligently.28
In Carnley v. Cochran,24 the question arose as to the application of
the principles of waiver to state courts. When the record did not
show that an indigent defendant had requested counsel,25 the Florida
Supreme Court either presumed that the defendant waived counsel
or that the trial judge had made an offer of counsel which the
petitioner had declined.2' The Supreme Court stated that the validity
of such presumptions was questionable because the only way the
accused could have protected- himself was to request counsel-'"a
formality upon which we have... said his right may not be made
to depend.""- The Court then said that the federal principles were
"equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in
state criminal proceedings.1 28 Since Escobedo establishes a constitu-
tional right to retained counsel at the time of arrest, and since a
defendant can make a competent waiver only if he knows of his
right; it follows that the police must advise him that he is entitled
to consult with his attorney. For the same reason, a mere warning
of the right to remain silent would not be sufficient to entitle police
officials to a period of interrogation before a person in custody is
allowed to speak with his attorney. Also, any failure by a defend-
"3Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938). In federal proceedings
the Court has stated that the sixth amendment is designed to protect those
who have no knowledge of the law, id. at 465, and that we do not presume
acquiesence in the loss of fundamental rights, id. at 464.
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
See note 27 infra.28The Court said that it was not clear what the Florida court had
presumed. 369 U.S. at 513-14.
" Id. at 514. The Court went further to say that a plea of guilty would
raise only a question of fact as to whether there had been a competent
and intelligent waiver. For a discussion of the problems of waiver and the
implications of a guilty plea before this decision, see Comment, 31 U. Cur.
L. REv. 591 (1964).28 369 U.S. at 515.
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ant to take advantage of his right after being informed of it must
be viewed in light of the requirement that a waiver be competent
and intelligent.2"
While Escobedo clears up the problem of when the right to re-
tained counsel attaches in the state pre-trial proceedings, it says
nothing about the problem the Court now has to face: should the
right to appointed counsel attach at the time of arrest for indigent
defendants?
The effect of the denial of appointed counsel during state crimi-
nal proceedings was first squarely decided by the Supreme Court in
the Scottsboro Cases.30 The denial of appointed counsel at or near
the time of trial for one's life was held to be a violation of the
fundamental principles of justice. Later, the Court decided that the
fundamental principles of justice did not require the appointment
of counsel in every case.3 1 In non-capital criminal proceedings, it
was decided that due process required, state appointed counsel only
where special circumstances such as age, 32 mentality,33 or expeti-
ence 4 necessitated the advice of counsel for a fair trial. As' a
result, the absolute right to counsel was restricted to trials for
zapital offenses, leaving the right unclearly defined in other cases.
The absolute right to counsel in capital proceedings was ex-
panded in 1961 when it was decided that the right attached at the
time of arraignment instead of trial.35 In 1963, attachment of the
right to appointed counsel in capital cases was advanced to the time
of the preliminary hearing.36 The rationale in both cases was that
after a person pleads to a capital charge, the Court will not look to
see if the lack of counsel resulted in prejudice to the defendant.3
" There may be cases in which the law of a state is not settled and the
advice of counsel could prevent a confession or plea to the wrong crime.
See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 507-08 (1962).
"Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). "[T]he intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him." Id. at 69. For a full discussion of this case, see 31 NEB. L. REv. 15,
16 (1952).
'"Betts v. Brady, 136 U.S. 455 (1942).
2E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haey v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948).
"E.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
"E.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958).
" Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
"White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59 (1963)."' Prejudice was necessary for a violation of fundamental fairness, the
1964l
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Each time the attachment of the right was advanced, the Court said
that the stage at which the right attached was a critical stage in the
proceedings where rights could be won or lost.
The last step taken by the Court with respect to appointed coun-
sel was the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,8 where it was held
that an indigent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel at the
time of trial for a non-capital felony. The requirement of special
circumstances, formally used for determining the necessity of coun-
-sel in such cases,"0 was abolished in felony cases, thus making the
'right to counsel absolute in all capital and felony cases at the time
of trial.
4 0
With the distinction between the two types of crimes no longer
present at the trial stage, it would seem that any advisory safeguards
provided in the capital case should be extended to the non-capital
situation. If the right to life and liberty are equal fundamental
human rights, and it now appears that they are,41 it follows that the
-absolute right to counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing that
now attaches in the proceedings for one's life should be extended
to like proceedings for one's liberty. Likewise, to carry this reason-
ing to the logical extreme, it would seem that any right to retained
counsel at the time of arrest should be extended to include a right
to appointed counsel at the time of arrest, whether the defendant
is to be tried for his life or liberty. Lending support to this latter
conclusion are two considerations: (1) that the time of arrest was
considered in Escobedo as critical, i.e., a time when rights can be
won or lost;42 and (2) that the exercise of constitutional rights
does not seem to depend on the degree of one's wealth or ability to
standard which formerly governed the necessity of counsel during the pre-
trial period. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.8 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a discussion of this case, see Comment,
39 Nonxm DAME LAW. 150 (1964); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1006
(1964),
"' See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
"0Another view is that Gideon has abolished the special circumstances
rule in all cases, giving an absolute right to counsel even in misdemeanor
cases. "The case supports the proposition that the test for the right to coun-
sel is not the severity of the penalty but the need for legal assistance." Com-
nient, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 150, 157-58 (1964).'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963).
42 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964). "What happened at
this interrogation could certainly 'affect the whole trial,' . . . since rights
'may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when




pay.4" Such a conclusion, though perhaps constitutionally sound,
would present grave problems of application to the states, possibly
leading to the necessity of a public defender system in each state
in order to comply with due process. 4
An immediate problem with which the courts must contend is
the retrospective application of the Escobedo case.' Even though
decisions are usually applied retroactively with no discussion,4" there
are strong arguments to the effect that the Court has the power
to define the scope and limits of a new decision and should do so.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has urged that a new requirement of due
process does not necessarily have to be applied retrospectively in
blind obediance to Blackstone's theory that a newly announced de-
cision is presently and always has been the law17 Instead, he con-
tented that the overruled decision should be considered as sound
law up to the time overruled and that the question of retrospective
or prospective application of the new rule should be determined by
the Court after considering administrative expediency.
48
An analagous situation was presented by Gideon v. Wain-
wright,4" where the question of the retroactivity of the newly an-
nounced requirement of appointed counsel in state, non-capital
trials remained unanswered. Later, because of denial of counsel
at trial, the Court vacated ten non-capital, pre-Gideon convictions
in a memorandum decision"0 and remanded the cases to the Florida
courts for consideration under the new rule. Mr. Justice Harlan
dissented, and without expressing an opinion as to the result that
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
"For a detailed discussion of appointed counsel and this solution for
problems arising in the state, see 38 IND. L.J. 623, 632 (1963).
5 Retroactivity will not be discussed in detail in this note. For a com-
plete discussion, see Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
" See, e.g., Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms, 357
U.S. 214 (1958). The Court applied the due process requirement of free
transcripts for the appeals of indigent defendants, a requirement announced
in 1956 in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), to the denial of a transcript
to a man convicted in 1936.
"' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (concurring opinion). Black-
stone's theory that decisions are only evidence of the law and not sources
of the law is fully discussed in GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 219-22 (2d ed. 1921).
"Justice Frankfurter advocated that such considerations would enable
the Court to reverse the old law as to the defendant before the Court with-
out applying the new decision to anyoie convicted prior to the date of the
decision. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 47, at 26 (concurring opinion)."372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
1964]
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should be reached,5 said that the retroactivity of Gideon should be
decided.
The retrospective aspect of the Gideon decision was discussed
at last by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals when it decided that
Gideon could be invoked in a habeas corpus proceeding by one who
was convicted before Gideon was even indicted. 2 The court said
that the question of retroactivity had been settled in the memo-
randum reversal of Doughty v. Maxwell5 3 where the defendant was
also convicted before Gideon's indictment. The petitioner in
Doughty had pleaded guilty to rape in 1959 without requesting to
see an attorney. He petitioned the Ohio courts for habeas corpus
before Gideon was decided, and the petition was rejected on the
ground that counsel had been waived. 4 The petition for certiorari
was received by the Supreme Court after Gideon. The Ohio court
was reversed and the case remanded in light of both Gideon and
Carnley v. Cochran.5 In addition, the court of appeals said that even
if the Court had decided to apply Gideon prospectively, it was retro-
active at least as to Gideon himself because he was to receive a new
trial. Therefore, said the court of appeals, the decision must be
said to be retroactive to the time of Gideon's conviction and must
apply to anyone denied counsel under similar circumstances since
that time in order to provide equal protection of the law." The
latter reasoning also applies to the Escobedo situation. That is, if
it is within the power of the courts to determine a holding to be
prospective only, and a court so holds,"7 Escobedo must be applied
" Id. at 2. In stating that the Court did not have to apply a rule
retrospectively simply because changes in constitutional principles had been
so applied in the past, Justice Harlan completely agrees with the view of
Justice Frankfurter that the Court does have some control over the future
scope and application of a new decision. See note 47 supra and accompany-
ing text.
"' United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d. Cir.
1964).
"376 U.S. 202 (1963).
Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962).
' 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
The case was first remanded by the Court in light of Gideon in Doughty v.
Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963). The Ohio court upheld the conviction on
the basis of waiver and when the case came to the Court for a second
time, the Court remanded it in light of Gideon and Carnley. Doughty v.
Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1963).
" United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 310 n.4
(1964).
" It must be remembered that, so far, the Court has not made any
such determination. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
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from the date of Escobedo's arrest, not. just from the date of the
decision, in order to provide equal protection of the law to those
denied counsel since the time of his arrest under similar circum-
stances.
Since the question of retroactivity was not before the Court in
Escobedo, and the Court did not take it upon itself to answer the
question,5" the lower federal courts will perhaps have to determine
its application to prior convictions through petitions for habeas
corpus. If it is decided that a change in due process requirements
need not be applied retroactively, one of the main considerations in
reaching a decision will be the opinion of the court as to the pur-
pose of the Escobedo decision.59 Was the purpose of the decision
only to deter police from denying counsel at this stage of the pro-
ceedings, or was it to prevent convictions based on unreliable evi-
dence which was admissible under the rule of fundamental fairness?
If the court finds that the decision was simply to extend the right
to counsel, it must then be decided if granting trials to those now
imprisoned is necessary to deter any future violation. It appears
that the old policy of allowing the police a reasonable period of
interrogation before the suspect is permitted to see counsel has not
resulted in unreliable convictions,6° and that the Supreme Court's
purpose was just to set a definite stage before trial when the right
to counsel attached. If this reasoning prevails, it does not seem
that granting new trials to those now imprisoned would be neces-
sary to deter future violations of the right by the police. The ex-
clusion of evidence obtained after a denial of counsel is sufficient
to discourage any possible violators of the right.
Finally, it should be noted that a statute6' similar to that in
"Compare Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Here the court made a change in the rule for determining sanity and express-
ly decided that the decision was for prospective application. Id. at 874.
" This same analogy was discussed in Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 942
(1962), as to the retroactive application of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962).
"° If there was prejudice to the defendant there was an automatic reversal
of a conviction under the rule of fundamental fairness which was the test
for determining the need for counsel at this stage in the proceedings. See
cases cited in note 15 supra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-47 (Supp. 1963), which provides:
Upon the arrest, detention, or deprivation of the liberties of any
person by an officer in this State, with or without a warrant .... it
shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest ... to permit the
person so arrested to communicate with counsel and friends im-
19641
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Escobedo has been the basis for a reversal of convictions by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.62 Three defendants were arrested,
placed in separate jails, and not allowed to contact anyone, includ-
ing each other. Even though the court stated no flat rule, it said,
in construing the statute, that "rights of communication go with
the man into the jail, and reasonable opportunity to exercise them
must be afforded by the restraining authorities. 0 3 This language
implies that the Escobedo decision will not necessitate a great
change, if any, in North Carolina practices with respect to retained
counsel. However, as pointed out elsewhere, 64 the North Carolina
system of providing appointed counsel before trial may be inade-
quate for insuring the guidance of counsel at a sufficiently early
stage in the proceedings. The statute dealing with appointed counsel
now provides that the judge shall advise the indigent defendant
in felony cases that he is entitled to appointed counsel "before he
is required to plead."65 The inadequacy of this statute in providing
for appointed counsel in North Carolina is illustrated in the pre-
liminary hearing procedure. Under the statutory provision for pre-
liminary hearings,66 a defendant is not required to plead at the
hearing; therefore, the judge is not required to appoint counsel for
him at this time.67 But, as previously noted, the Supreme Court
held in 196368 that the right to appointed counsel in capital pro-
ceedings attached at the time of the preliminary hearing; it is likely
that the holding will be expanded to give the same right in felony
cases as well. 69 Thus, the North Carolina General Assembly is pre-
sented with the immediate problem of appointment of counsel at
mediately, and the right of such persons to communicate with coun-
sel and friends shall not be denied.
2 State v. Wheeler, 249 N.C. 187, 105 S.E.2d 615 (1958). For other
cases which have been decided in light of the statutes in other states, see
38 N.C.L. REv. 630 (1960).
"8 State v. Wheeler, supra note 62, at 192, 105 S.E.2d at 620.
"Watts, Indigent Defendants and Criminal Jitice, 42 N.C.L. Ryv. 322,
337 (1964).
°5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (Supp. 1963).
60N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-89 (1953).
IT The defendant is entitled to counsel at this time under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-87 (1953), the pertinent part of which reads, "the defendant shall be
allowed a reasonable time before the hearing begins in which to send for
and advise with counsel." However, in looking at the language used, it is
clear that this provision pertains only to retained counsel.White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
69 See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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this stage in the proceedings.70 In addition, the legislature is faced
with the problem of deciding whether to provide for appointed
counsel at the time of arrest.71 Even if no immediate statutory
action is taken, preparation should be made for the possibility of
such a requirement through future Supreme Court decisions.
Roy H. MICHAUX, JR.
Constitutional Law-State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
The State of Washington imposed a tax upon the privilege of
a foreign corporation's doing business in that state,' the tax being
measured by the corporation's gross receipts from sales of motor
vehicles, parts, and accessories to independent retail dealers in Wash-
ington. The taxpayer, General Motors, protested' the tax on the
grounds that it constituted a levy upon the privilege of engaging
in interstate business and thus was repugnant to both the due
process and commerce clauses of the Constitution. Concluding
that "the tax is levied on the incidents of a substantial local busi-
ness,"' the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the tax.
As typifies such a corporate giant in this modem era, the sales
organization maintained by General Motors is complex.4 For pres-
o For a discussion of the amendments proposed in the federal rules to
provide for appointed counsel before the defendant ever sees the judge,
see note 14 supra.
"' See notes 42 & 43 supra and accompanying text for the proposition
that appointed counsel should be provided at the time of arrest in all felony
cases.
I REV. CODE WAsSH. 82.04.270 (1962).
2The Supreme Court of Washington sustained the tax. General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 60 Wash.2d 862, 376 P.2d 843 (1962).'General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 (1964).
'Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, and General Motors Parts are all sub-
stantially independent "divisions" of the corporation. For sales and admin-
istrative purposes, each "division" is geographically divided into "zones"
which in turn are further sub-divided into "districts." During the period
in question, all "divisions" except General Motors Parts maintained forml
"zone" offices in Portland, Oregon. In Seattle, Washington, was situated
a warehouse operated by the Parts Division and a "branch" office under
the Chevrolet "zone" headquarters. There were no offices at the "district"
level, and the "district managers" operated largely gut of their homes under
the jurisdiction of the Portland office. Their primary functions were to
oversee the dealer organization and to otherwise work with and advise
the dealers in the promotion of sales. It should be noted that these "district
managers" had no authority to accept orders from the dealers; this was a
function performed at the "zone" level. Note also the fact that executive
personnel from the Portland office visited each dealer in the "zone" regular-
19641
